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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The old adage “the only two certainties in life are death and taxes” is 
certainly true for most of the population.1  From prince to pauper, every man 
must eventually pay his due to two entities: the Grim Reaper and the IRS.  
Corporations, however, fare better than the rest of us in this regard; they have 
many of the same legal rights as flesh and blood humans with the added 
benefit of not having to be concerned with mortality.2  Ironically, this means 
that taxes are in some ways more certain even than death.  This has in no 
way discouraged corporations from attempting to evade the only remaining 
inevitability of their existence.  Even corporations that have not managed to 
entirely avoid taxes have been largely successful in limiting their exposure.3  
Similarly, rather than trying to increase their tax revenue, many nations have 
deliberately lowered their tax rate in order to motivate foreign businesses to 
bring them jobs and increased capital.4  Perhaps no country has been more 
successful at enticing corporations with attractive tax benefits than Ireland.5  
However, the competition between nations for lucrative transnational 
investments can easily breed resentment, and nations unwilling to offer such 
beneficial terms to foreign investors feel that their more open-handed 
counterparts are engaging in unfair competition.6  This produces significant 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered: Death and Taxes, FREAKONOMICS (Feb. 17, 2016), http:// 
freakonomics.com/2011/02/17/quotes-uncovered-death-and-taxes/.  Commonly attributed to 
Benjamin Franklin, the actual quotation may have instead originated from Christopher Bullock 
or Edward Ward. Id. 
 2 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield & Adam Winkler, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Cultivation of 
Corporate Personhood, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2015/06/raisins-hotels-corporate-personhood-supreme-court/396773/. 
 3 See, e.g., Alexia Fernandez Campbell, The Cost of Corporate Tax Avoidance, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/corporate-ta 
x-avoidance/478293/ (noting that America’s fifty largest corporations had minimized their 
taxes in recent years by moving over a trillion dollars in shell companies on foreign shores). 
 4 See, e.g., Tim Wallace, Ireland Slashes Corporation Tax to Just 6.25pc-but There’s a 
Catch, TELEGRAPH  (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/budget/11929790/Ire 
land-slashes-corporation-tax-to-just-6.25pc-but-theres-a-catch.html (documenting a dip in the 
Irish corporate tax rate from 12.5% to 6.5% for companies that engage in qualified research 
and development work with Irish employees). 
 5 See, e.g., Ben Chapman, Ireland’s Economy Grows 26.3% in 2015 as Corporations Flock 
to Low Tax Rate, INDEPENDENT (July 13, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/n 
ews/ireland-s-economy-grows-263-in-2015-as-corporations-flock-to-low-tax-rate-a7133321. 
html (projecting growth of 26.3% in the Irish economy over 2015 due primarily to the nation’s 
relatively low corporate tax rate). 
 6 Brussels Puts Pressure on Dublin to Close Tax Loopholes, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11153053/Brussels-puts-pressure-on-Dublin-to-
close-tax-loopholes.html (documenting threats by the European Commission to launch an 
investigation of Irish tax practices unless it increases its rate of effective corporate taxation). 
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complications, most notably in the European Union (EU).  While each 
member state maintains its sovereignty, there is also a supranational body, 
the European Commission, that ensures that members do not engage in 
unfair commercial practices.7  This does not necessarily mean that countries 
offering low tax rates to multinational corporations are in violation of their 
obligations within the European community.  Realistically, however, this is 
often the result as companies frequently negotiate agreements with individual 
corporations that extend to them a reduction on the country’s already low 
corporate tax rate.8 
When confronted with potential unfair taxation, the European 
Commission can attempt to rectify a competitive imbalance by requiring that 
the nation that gave a company preferential tax treatment reassess the 
company’s taxes to appropriate rates.9  Because it is primarily American 
corporations that are lured into making off-shore investments in nations with 
beneficial tax structures, tax reassessments pose significant challenges to the 
U.S. government.10  
The United States then has to address the problem of having some of its 
largest and most well-known multinational corporations face staggering 
amounts of newly assessed back-taxes.11 The most obvious concern is 
addressing backlash from the private sector for what it perceives as an unfair 
revision of an agreement with a foreign government.  However, the United 
States has a more direct concern than quelling corporate anger over an 
increased tax bill.  An increase in the amount of taxes paid by a corporation 
to foreign nations will reduce the amount of taxes payable to the IRS once 
the funds reach U.S. shores.12  This represents a rather novel problem: a 
country is compelled to collect taxes from a corporation at the expense of the 
corporation’s home country, which directly loses its own tax revenue as a 
result.  This therefore presents the question that this note will answer: What 
                                                                                                                   
 7 State Aid Control, EUR. COMM’N (Sept. 10, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_ 
aid/overview/index_en.html. 
 8 Harriet Taylor, How Apple Managed to Pay a 0.005 Percent Tax Rate in 2014, CNBC 
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/30/how-apples-irish-subsidiaries-paid-a-0005-p 
ercent-tax-rate-in-2014.html (noting that Apple privately negotiated a more beneficial corporate 
tax plan with Ireland). 
 9 Foo Yun Chee & Padraic Halpin, EU Hits Apple with $14.5 Billion Irish Tax Demand, 
REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-taxavoidance-idUSKC 
N114211. 
 10 Campbell, supra note 3.  
 11 State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth up to €13 Billion, EUR. 
COMM’N (Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm.  
 12 The European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer Pricing Rulings, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/ treaties/Documents/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf. 
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avenues, if any, are available to the United States, under domestic and 
international law, in order to retaliate against a perceived unjust taxation of 
American corporations? 
Commentators have noted an obscure portion of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) that would allow the President to unilaterally double 
the taxes assessed on corporations that originate from any nation subjecting 
U.S. companies to discriminatory taxation.13  However, this provision of the 
code has never been exercised, and its current status in light of modern 
American jurisprudence and the international treaty obligations of the United 
States is uncertain.14  Current scholarship focuses almost exclusively on how 
tax policy relates to trade policy and does not contemplate the legality of a 
specific provision of domestic law being used in retaliation for taxes being 
reassessed by a supranational body.15 
Setting aside the political feasibility of any increase in U.S. taxes assessed 
against foreign corporations, this Note will evaluate the legal feasibility of 
the use of § 891 of the IRC as a retaliatory measure to increase taxes 
assessed by the European Commission against multinational corporations 
based in the United States.  First, this Note will explore the background that 
has given rise to this legal issue.  Next, it will assess the likelihood of 
domestic legal complications arising as a result of the use of an antiquated 
statute.  This Note will then examine any relevant international legal 
ramifications of such use, including the bilateral tax treaties that the United 
States maintains with individual EU member states, as well as the obligations 
it bears as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).16 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past few years, Ireland has become an increasingly attractive tax 
haven for multinational corporations.  Taking into account only its nominal 
corporate tax rate, Ireland is one of the most attractive investment locations 
in Europe.17  This has precipitated a severe backlash from multiple nations, 
                                                                                                                   
 13 26 U.S.C.A. § 891 (West 2016). 
 14 Reuters, U.S. Tax Code May Allow Dramatic Retaliation in E.U. Apple Case, FORTUNE, 
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/31/u-s-tax-retaliation-apple-case/. 
 15 Yariv Brauner, International Trade and Tax Agreements May be Coordinated, but not 
Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251 (2005). 
 16 U.S. Tax Treaties, IRS (Sept. 2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p901.pdf.  
 17 Kyle Pomerleau & Emily Potosky, Corporate Income Tax Rates Around the World, 2016 
TAX FOUNDATION (Aug. 18, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/corporate-income-tax-rates-aroun 
d-world-2016 (comparing international corporate tax rates and demonstrating that Ireland has 
one of the twenty lowest global tax rates, less than a third of the rate in the United States). 
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most notably France and Germany, who championed a failed attempt to 
establish a common European Union corporation tax rate.18  Failing to enact 
change through other avenues, the European community turned to the 
European Commission which accelerated their investigation into a number of 
American companies residing in various European states including 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.19 
In June of 2014, the European Commission turned its attention to Ireland 
and initiated an investigation into the tax treatment the nation had extended 
to Apple, specifically focusing on the decision of Irish courts to grant Apple 
tax rates well below one percent.20  For its part, Ireland insists that its 
conduct was in keeping with standards set by the European Commission.21  
Ultimately, the European Commission assessed a fine of over $14 billion to 
be placed on Ireland for violating EC standards, with some estimates putting 
the final amount as high as $19 billion.22 
The decision generated controversy for multiple reasons.  On a broad 
level, this decision of the European Commission raised issues of sovereignty 
because it directly contravened a clear ruling by a national court on a 
traditionally domestic legal matter.23  More specifically, Ireland and the 
United States objected to the decision on two grounds.  First, they contended 
the European Commission departed from precedent in determining that 
Apple’s tax agreement constituted impermissible state aid, and they alleged 
that the shift in standards was grounded in political motivations rather than 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Matthew Holehouse & Christopher Williams, France and Germany Behind Plans for 
‘Common EU Corporation Tax,’ TELEGRAPH (May 26, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/europe/eu/11630468/France-and-Germany-behind-plans-for-common-EU-corporati 
on-tax.html. 
 19 Reuters, U.S. Treasury Accuses EU of Grabbing Tax Revenues With Apple Penalty, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 31, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/31/u-s-treasury-accuses-eu-of-grabbing-ta 
x-revenues-with-apple-penalty/ (noting that companies under investigation include Starbucks, 
Amazon, McDonalds, and Google). 
 20 State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple, supra note 11. 
 21 See, e.g., Henry McDonald, Irish Government Split over Immediate Appeal Against 
Apple Tax Bill, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/20 
16/aug/31/ireland-government-split-apple-tax-bill-immediate-appeal (noting that while the 
majority of Irish political opinion was in favor of appealing the Apple ruling in order to stay 
attractive to other multinational corporations, a vocal minority advocated for taking the 
considerable payout and using it for domestic welfare). 
 22 Kif Leswig, Apple Could be on the Hook for $19 Billion in Taxes, and the Obama 
Administration is Livid, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-
taxes-us-treasury-european-commission-2016-8. 
 23 Catherine Boyle, Ireland Will Have to Accept Apple Tax Payment, Leaders Admit, CNBC 
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/07/ireland-will-have-to-accept-apple-tax-paymen 
t-leaders-admit.html. 
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an unbiased application of tax policy.24  Second, from a policy standpoint, 
the ruling would detract from Ireland’s attractiveness to businesses and U.S. 
tax revenues.25 
The United States has thus far been unsuccessful in attempting to 
dissuade the European Commission from imposing these increased taxes 
through normal diplomatic channels.26  At the time of writing, the ruling is 
currently pending appeal, but should it stand, would represent a considerable 
shift in the international tax system that would be detrimental to both the 
United States and tax haven countries.27   
The United States does not possess the right to intervene directly in the 
appeal of the European Commission’s fine on Apple.  It is an interested 
party, but it is not being ordered to assess back taxes on any corporations.  
Therefore, it is appropriate to examine possible domestic avenues that would 
allow the federal government to exert pressure in defense of American 
corporations.  Section 891 of the IRC appears to present the most direct way 
to allow the United States to implement retaliatory taxation.28  
Section 891 provides that “[w]henever the President finds that, under the 
laws of any foreign country, citizens or corporations of the United States are 
being subjected to discriminatory . . . taxes, the President shall so proclaim 
and the rates of tax . . . shall . . . be doubled in the case of each citizen and 
corporation of such foreign country. . . .”29  On its face, the law appears to 
                                                                                                                   
 24 The European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer Pricing Rulings, 
supra note 12 (noting that the Apple case appears to deviate from precedent in two ways: 
First, the Commission seems to have conflated two factors used to determine impermissible 
state aid rather than analyzing them separately, as was the norm.  Second, the Commission 
compares the treatment of Apple to domestic corporations, rather than other multinational 
corporations, which was the norm).  See also Romero J.S. Tavares et al., The Intersection of 
EU State Aid and U.S. Tax Deferral: A Spectacle of Fireworks, Smoke, and Mirrors, 19 FLA. 
TAX REV. 121, 186 (2016) (“State aid investigations are well-established under EU law, but 
tax-specific investigations based on tax rulings have only recently been considered by the EU 
Commission and were mostly driven by the political climate surrounding the G20-OECD 
BEPS Project.”). 
 25 John Mulligan, FDI to Ireland Could be Hit by Adverse Apple Tax Decision, INDEPENDENT 
(Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/fdi-to-ireland-could-be-hit-by-adverse-
apple-tax-decision-34389539.html.  But see Jeffrey M. Kadet, No, U.S. Taxpayers Won’t Pay 
Apple’s $14.5 Billion Irish Tax Bill, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janet 
novack/2016/09/13/no-u-s-taxpayers-wont-pay-apples-14-5-billion-irish-tax-bill/#7e5df11213af 
(indicating that Apple is likely to keep a significant amount of taxable income offshore, even in 
case of an adverse ruling implicating the European Commission fine).  
 26 The European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer Pricing Rulings, 
supra note 12, at 5 (indicating that the Department of the Treasury is considering possible 
responses to what it perceives as the unfair targeting of American companies). 
 27 Kadet, supra note 25. 
 28 REUTERS, supra note 14. 
 29 26 U.S.C.A. § 891 (West 2016). 
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give complete discretion to the President in regards to determining what 
constitutes discriminatory taxation and when such discrimination calls for the 
imposition of retaliatory measures.30  The implementation of retaliation to 
that degree would certainly carry significant political implications.31 
Nevertheless, the language relating to discriminatory taxation in § 891 
certainly appears to map roughly to the recent language espoused by the 
Treasury Department.32 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Before investigating the implications of this tax provision in a domestic 
and international context, it is necessary to briefly discuss the international 
legal tax structure.  For purposes of this Note, three key areas are particularly 
relevant: bilateral tax treaties establishing basic principles of taxation 
between two nations, OECD measures adopted via consensus to ensure 
fairness in tax policy and reduce the abuse of corporate tax havens, and the 
WTO policy of forwarding tax disputes to the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) when they are perceived as protectionist measures.  
At the broadest level, international tax law is dictated by a series of 
bilateral treaties.  The United States maintains sixty-six different bilateral 
treaties with various nations.33  Under these treaties, residents of each 
signatory nation are assessed a reduced tax rate on certain types of income 
originating in the foreign state.34  Types of income not specified in a treaty, 
or residents of nations with which the U.S. has no treaty are subject to 
normal domestic and foreign tax rates.35  
This bilateral, ad-hoc structure differs significantly from the perhaps more 
well-known international trade structure.36  There have been recent efforts to 
modernize the international tax system.  However, it remains largely 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. 
 31 REUTERS, supra note 14 (noting the level of escalation that retaliatory taxation would 
likely entail). 
 32 The European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer Pricing Rulings, 
supra note 12 (noting that the European Commission was unfairly targeting American 
companies in assessing back taxes). 
 33 See U.S. Tax Treaties, supra note 16 (Apr. 2013) (listing U.S. tax treaties alphabetically). 
 34 Id.  For example, a foreign resident pays reduced U.S. taxes on income originating in the 
United States and vice-versa.  
 35 Id. 
 36 See generally Brauner, supra note 15 (discussing the nature of the international trade 
regime as a more integrated multi-lateral system and comparing it to a slightly dated tax 
system which relies on bilateral treaties). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:47 PM 
816  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:809 
 
 
anachronistic compared to its more advanced trade counterpart which relies 
on the WTO and multilateral treaties.37  
Although some treaties vary slightly in their exact terms, the majority of 
tax treaties are based off of a set model.  The United States has established a 
Model Income Tax Convention to serve as a template for its bilateral 
treaties.38  This template in turn was heavily influenced by the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, which is provided to help equalize tax treatment among its 
member states.39 
Tax treaties generally have two primary goals: eliminating double 
taxation and preventing tax evasion.40  These goals attempt to strike a 
balance between ensuring entities do not pay duplicative taxes to two 
separate nations, while also guaranteeing that tax revenue is eventually paid 
to one of the nations. 
However, the key provision of U.S. tax treaties to keep in mind for 
purposes of this analysis are the nondiscrimination clauses, which are a 
constant presence in the U.S. tax treaty template.41 Generally stated, 
nondiscrimination clauses prohibit a government from levying a higher tax 
rate against a foreign national protected under the treaty than the government 
could levy against one of its own citizens.42  Nondiscrimination would 
appear to summarily defeat the purpose of § 891, but two other key factors 
must be kept in mind.  First, it is a key principle of trade law that retaliatory 
measures can be applied to countries employing unfair trade practices; 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016) 
(providing a general discussion of the relatively successful efforts by the OECD to prevent 
double taxation and establish more uniform rules).  But see U.S. Tax Treaties, supra note 16 
(Apr. 2013) (illustrating that tax treaties are still universally negotiated on a bilateral basis). 
 38 United States Model Income Tax Convention, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 17, 
2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%2 
0Mode l-2016.pdf. 
 39 Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, OECD (Oct. 30, 
2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-articles.pdf. 
 40 Note on the Revision of the Manual for Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties, U.N. (Oct. 
2011), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/seventhsession/CRP11_Introduction_20 11.pdf.  For a 
general discussion to double taxation and tax avoidance, see Sung-Soo Han, The 
Harmonization of Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, 7 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 29, 30 (2011) 
(“A high level of international cooperation has been achieved to protect individual states and 
their taxpaying citizens from . . . double taxation and tax evasion.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Sanford H. Goldberg & Peter A. Glicklich, Treaty-Based Nondiscrimination: 
Now You See It Now You Don’t, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1992) (noting that the nondiscrimination 
clause of tax-treaties provides the main prohibition against engaging in retaliatory taxation). 
 42 United States Model Income Tax Convention, supra note 38, at 54 (“Nationals of a 
Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any taxation or any 
requirement connected therewith that is more burdensome than the taxation and connected 
requirements to which nationals of that other Contracting State in the same circumstances . . . .”). 
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international tax law is similar enough that an argument advocating 
temporary retaliation could not be rejected out of hand.43 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, unlike the international trade 
regime, which possesses an independent enforcement mechanism through the 
WTO, most tax treaties have no independent dispute resolution mechanism.44  
Arbitration is mentioned as a recourse in the majority of U.S. tax treaties, but 
it almost always requires the consent of both parties, or at minimum, a lack 
of their objection.45  International tax relies entirely upon agreement for 
dispute resolution.  This lack of an independent adjudicatory method is a 
rarity in the context of modern international law and a fact that makes an 
analysis of the legality and implications of § 891 of the U.S. tax code 
particularly intriguing. 
In addition to the strict terms of tax treaties, two supranational entities 
have a significant impact on the structure of the international tax regime: the 
OECD and the WTO.  Because the OECD serves primarily in a monitoring 
and advisory capacity seeking to bring greater cohesion to tax treaties 
between member states, it cannot directly force states to comply with its 
standards or recommendations.46  However, OECD commentaries and 
recommendations are often given significant weight by domestic courts in 
interpreting a nation’s tax treaty obligations.47  Notably however, U.S. courts 
rely on OECD commentaries less frequently as interpretive tools because 
“the United States--uniquely among major sovereigns--publishes a highly 
detailed technical explanation of its tax treaties at the time each such treaty is 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Derek Devgun, International Fiscal Wars for the Twenty-First Century: An Assessment 
of Tax-Based Trade Retaliation, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 353, 376 (1996) (noting that 
retaliation is permissible in an international trade regime and the similarities between trade 
and tax). 
 44 See, e.g., Goldberg & Glicklich, supra note 41, at 52 (noting that international tax relies 
entirely on bilateral negotiation and arbitration by mutual agreement in order to resolve any 
possible tax disputes).  
 45 Compare United States Model Income Tax Convention, supra note 38, at 58 (providing for 
arbitration unless “the competent authorities of the Contracting States have agreed prior to the 
date on which the arbitration otherwise would be submitted that the particular case is not suitable 
for resolution through arbitration”), and Technical Explanation of the Protocol Signed at Berlin 
on June 1, 2006 Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and The 
Federal Republic of Germany, IRS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/germanyte 
07.pdf (requiring mandatory arbitration for certain provisions, but notably not specifically 
including violations of non-discrimination), with Technical Explanation of the Convention 
Between the Government of the United States of America and Government of Ireland, IRS (Sept. 
23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/iretech.pdf (allowing for arbitration, but noting 
“[n]othing in this provision requires that any case be submitted for arbitration”). 
 46 See generally Grinberg, supra note 37 (providing a thorough review of the effect of 
OECD measures including new recommendations resulting from the BEPS plan). 
 47 Id. at 1184. 
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sent to the United States Senate for ratification.”48  However, OECD 
measures still provide valuable insight into movement of international tax 
policy towards greater consolidation and therefore bear further consideration. 
The OECD has recently reinvigorated its attempts to standardize tax 
policy and combat tax avoidance through its comprehensive Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting project (BEPS).49  The project addresses fifteen distinct 
areas of action and provides recommendations for each.50  Of particular 
interest to this Note are the final two actions.  Action 14 aims to improve 
dispute resolution by improving mutual agreement procedure (MAP) 
measures, and Action 15 calls for the development of a multilateral 
instrument to modify current bilateral treaties.51 
These measures are non-binding and will doubtless take a considerable 
amount of effort to be put into force.  However, they represent a considerable 
step towards the harmonization of tax treaties. In particular, Action 14 has 
resulted in multiple nations committing to implementation of mandatory 
binding arbitration for dispute resolution.52 
In addition to the OECD, the WTO also plays a role in determining 
international tax policy.  Compared to the OECD, the WTO addresses tax 
policy far less frequently, but resolves issues in a much more direct fashion.  
Although the WTO concerns itself primarily with trade and not taxes, its 
DSB will not hesitate to address tax related disputes when they appear to be 
direct or indirect barriers to trade.  Stated another way, the WTO is both 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Id. at 1185. 
 49 See generally OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: 2015 Final Reports, 
OECD (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summaries.pdf (providing 
a general discussion of the scope of the BEPS project and providing its preliminary results).   
 50 Id. 
 51 See Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14: 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-
Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-
14-2015-final-report_9789264241633-en (providing recommendations designed to “strengthen 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the MAP process”); Action 15: A Mandate for the 
Development of a Multilateral Instrument on Tax Treaty Measures to Tackle BEPS, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-15-manda 
te-for-development-of-multilateral-instrument.pdf (the main objective of a multilateral 
instrument would be to modify existing bilateral tax treaties . . . to implement the tax treaty 
measures developed during the BEPS Project, without the need to expend resources individually 
renegotiating each treaty bilaterally”). 
 52 Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14: 2015 Final Report, 
supra note 51, at 10 (noting that Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States have “declared their 
commitment to provide for mandatory binding MAP arbitration in their bilateral tax treaties”). 
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willing and well-situated to take action when a tax provision violates the 
fundamental standard of National Treatment (NT).53 
Over the past twenty years, just under ten percent of disputes submitted to 
the DSB have centered around tax policy.54  These interventions however, 
are largely limited to instances where a tax is adjusted selectively to apply to 
certain products to replicate the effects of a tariff.55  One seminal case held 
that a U.S. rule allowing “a partial tax exemption for the income of a foreign 
corporate subsidiary derived from handling sales of US exports . . .” violated 
the European Commissions standards because it provided a considerable 
effective tax reduction in certain income originating from exports.56  
Therefore, if a tax provision is perceived as substantively affecting trade 
terms, then regardless of the dispute resolution mechanism of the individual 
tax treaty, the WTO provides an efficient forum for the provision to be 
challenged.  Furthermore, decisions by the WTO have been effective in 
producing changes in underlying domestic tax law, albeit slowly.57 
Lastly, before analyzing the feasibility of § 891, the interaction between 
domestic law and international tax treaty obligations must be discussed.  
Under U.S. law, IRC provisions are required to incorporate treaty 
obligations.58  However, treaties and laws affecting revenue are both 
accorded equal authority under domestic law.59 
In practice, this means that tax treaty overrides can be accomplished only 
through a statute enacted later in time.60  Unsurprisingly, such overrides are 
                                                                                                                   
 53 See Brauner, supra note 15 (discussing that of the two key trade provisions underlying 
the WTO, National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Status, only National Treatment is 
reflected in bilateral tax treaties leaving the WTO on uncertain footing when considering 
issues involving Most Favored Nation Status). 
 54 Michael Daly, Is the WTO a World Tax Organization? A Primer on WTO Rules for Tax 
Policymakers, IMF FISCAL AFF. DEP’T (Mar. 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tn 
m/2016/tnm1602.pdf (“Since 1995, taxation has been the cause of over 40 of the 500 
disputes . . . submitted to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body . . .”). 
 55 Id. at 17 (noting that income taxes were generally not viewed as subject to WTO 
provisions because they are not taxes on products). 
 56 Id. at 35–36. 
 57 See Brauner, supra note 15, at 252–53 (“Despite strong political resistance, which fed a 
long and costly legislative process, the United States recently repealed these [prohibited 
export tax] subsidies.”). 
 58 26 U.S.C.A. § 894(a)(1) (West 2016) (“The provisions of this title shall be applied to any 
taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such 
taxpayer.”). 
 59 26 U.S.C.A. § 7852(d)(1) (West 2016) (“For purposes of determining the relationship 
between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue, neither the 
treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law.”). 
 60 Devgun, supra note 43, at 373; see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) 
(noting that a treaty obligation is not “abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless such 
purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed”). 
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not viewed favorably by other nations or the OECD.61  However, the United 
States is noted as a “particularly heavy user of treaty override,” particularly 
when attempting to prevent treaty shopping.62  Specifically related to the 
recent Apple tax dispute, several senators have advocated taking retaliatory 
action in response to the European Commission’s reassessment of Apple’s 
tax bill.63 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Keeping in mind the number of different legal regimes influencing U.S. 
international tax policy, would it be legally feasible for the United States to 
invoke § 891 of the IRC in response to the increased taxes assessed by the 
European Commission against Apple?  Any attempt to invoke this provision 
would be subject first to challenges under domestic law and then would be 
subject to a response under tax treaty provisions, OECD policy, and WTO 
standards.  Ultimately, while the exercise of § 891 would not likely be 
upheld by domestic courts or international tribunals, it would be unlikely to 
produce negative consequences in the short term and would therefore serve 
as a powerful signal of the United States’ objection to recent actions by the 
European Commission. 
A challenge to the execution of § 891 under domestic law would be the 
first significant obstacle to its implementation.  Any party challenging the 
use of the statute would have a relatively strong case that it would be 
impermissible under a governing bilateral tax treaty.  In general, because 
§ 891 was passed in 1934, it would necessarily be earlier in time to any U.S. 
bilateral tax treaty.64  National treatment is a key portion of all U.S. tax 
treaties, and by its very nature, the double taxation authorized by § 891 treats 
certain foreign nationals differently from U.S. citizens.  The implementation 
of § 891 would seemingly contradict any such treaty and the treaty would be 
                                                                                                                   
 61 See Grinberg, supra note 37, at 1192 (“In the late 1980s, when the United States enacted 
two tax treaty overrides, the OECD issued a report that quite scathingly condemned such 
behavior, and that report received equal levels of support from common law and civil law 
countries alike”); id. at 1192–93 (making an interesting note that despite  the poor reception 
given to treaty overrides, two countries ostensibly committed to enacting BEPS Action 14, 
Australia and the United Kingdom, proposed and enacted treaty overrides respectively “in 
reaction to the BEPS project”).  
 62 Devgun, supra note 43, at 373–74. 
 63 Letter from the Honorable Jacob Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Senators Orrin Hatch, 
Ron Wyden, Rob Portman, and Chuck Schumer (May 23, 20160, http://www.finance.senate. 
gov/chairmans-news/hatch-wyden-portman-schumer-continue-push-for-fairness-in-eu-state-ai 
d-investigations (advocating a response by the Treasury Department, possibly including 
invoking § 891 of the IRC). 
 64 REUTERS, supra note 14. 
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accorded precedence.  However, there are three possible responses to the 
objection that U.S. treaties are later in time than § 891.  
First, the United States could target the provision against a nation with 
which it has no tax treaty.  This would be a uniquely direct solution, as there 
would be no grounds for a party to object that there was a violation of treaty 
provisions.  Furthermore, this solution is attractive because it is essentially 
not the state levying increased taxes against American corporations that the 
United States takes objection to.  Rather, the European Commission, which 
is compelling its member states to assess these higher taxes, is the source of 
the problem.  Therefore, while it may be unconventional, the United States 
could implement § 891 against a state that is a member of the European 
Commission but with which the United States has no tax treaty.  Although 
there are not many nations which fit this criteria, Croatia presents at least one 
opportunity to implement this unique strategy.65 
Second, the United States could assert that it is within the President’s 
discretion to implement the statute as a temporary response to unfair taxation 
and that the use of the statute is not designed to change the fundamental 
obligations between the United States and the targeted nation.  This 
argument would assert on policy grounds that the purpose of § 891 was to 
allow for the President to employ temporary retaliatory measures.  In 
contrast, it could be argued that the primary goal of a national treatment 
provision in bilateral tax treaties is to ensure that there is no recurring 
discriminatory application of tax rules.  Therefore, even if the application of 
§ 891 constitutes a technical violation of a bilateral treaty, a court may be 
willing to allow the statute to be implemented because of the unique 
circumstances resulting in its use. 
Finally, Congress could act directly to address the argument by passing a 
statute expressly reaffirming the President’s authority to utilize § 891.  This 
would allow the legislature to clearly indicate an intention to allow the 
President to implement double taxation despite U.S. treaty obligations.  
Congress would likely enact a statute utilizing one of two designs.  Either the 
statute would broadly authorize the application of § 891 against any state, 
regardless of treaty obligations, or the statute could authorize the use of 
§ 891 against only one specific nation.  Either measure would clearly resolve 
any dispute regarding the supremacy of § 891 over U.S. treaty obligations 
and ensure that domestic courts would not present a barrier to the imposition 
of a retaliatory tax. 
                                                                                                                   
 65 U.S. Tax Treaties, supra note 16 (listing nations with which the U.S. has a tax treaty, but 
not including Croatia). 
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If tensions rise to the point that the President seriously considers 
implementing § 891 as a retaliatory measure, it would likely not prove 
difficult to receive a Congressional blessing on this action in the form of an 
affirming statute.  This is particularly true if the Republican Party retains 
control of both chambers of Congress, given that a retaliatory measure would 
seem to agree with the party’s current stance on globalism in general.  In the 
absence of express Congressional approval, while there is a compelling 
argument to permit temporary retaliation against a foreign state, there is a 
considerable likelihood that an exercise of § 891 against a nation with which 
the United States has a tax treaty would be struck down by domestic courts. 
Even if a retaliatory tax goes unchallenged in domestic law, general 
bilateral treaty obligations would present difficulties to the United States.  
Assuming that the United States does indeed target a nation with which it 
shares a bilateral treaty instead of letting a nation with no treaty stand as 
proxy for the European Commission, a retaliatory tax would almost certainly 
be challenged under the terms of the treaty as a violation.  This would result 
even if domestic law determines that § 891 supersedes the treaty.66 
The exact impact of a violation of a bilateral tax treaty would depend 
greatly upon which nation the tax was levied against.  The United States 
would be faced with essentially no ill-consequences if it levied the tax 
against a nation, like Ireland, without a mandatory arbitration clause.67  On 
the other hand, if the tax was levied against a nation like Germany with a 
mandatory arbitration provision, the United States would run the risk of 
being forced to either participate in arbitration in which it would likely lose, 
or simply refuse to engage in arbitration and guarantee an adverse ruling.68 
The United States would therefore be well-served to ensure that any 
nation it targets for retaliatory taxation does not have a mandatory arbitration 
provision in its bilateral tax treaty.  However, even if the treaty does call for 
mandatory arbitration, the United States might not necessarily have an 
adverse result if it can argue that its actions do not constitute a specific 
trigger for such a mandatory provision.69  However, even if binding 
                                                                                                                   
 66 See Han, supra note 40, at 49 (noting that while the United States can override a pre-
existing treaty under domestic law, it does not have that same right under international law). 
 67 See Technical Explanation of the Convention Between the Government of the United 
States of America and Government of Ireland, supra note 45, at 92 (“[W]here the competent 
authorities have been unable to resolve a disagreement regarding the application or 
interpretation of the Convention, the disagreement may, by mutual consent of the competent 
authorities and the affected taxpayers, be submitted for arbitration.”). 
 68 See id. at 38 (requiring mandatory arbitration in certain circumstances). 
 69  Id. at 38–39 (noting that mandatory arbitration is required in cases alleging violations of 
four different treaty Articles, but not including Article 24 which mandates the principle of 
nondiscrimination). 
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arbitration is not specifically called for in nondiscrimination disputes, it may 
still be possible for a STATE to argue that a doubled tax rate also implicates 
a treaty article where binding arbitration is required.  Therefore, unless 
targeting a nation like Germany conveys a significant political advantage 
over targeting a nation like Ireland, the United States should forgo the risk of 
being compelled to submit to arbitration. 
If the United States successfully evades challenges under domestic law 
and dispute resolution mechanisms under a relevant bilateral treaty, it is 
likely to face immediate condemnation from the OECD.  Because the OECD 
has no binding enforcement mechanisms and its measures are all advisory, 
the United States would not be assessed direct penalties by the entity.  
Despite this, there would be significant intangible costs associated with such 
a dramatic break from OECD policy. Because the OECD has made a 
concerted effort to unify tax policy and encourage nations to adopt 
mandatory, binding dispute resolution procedures, any effort by the United 
States to circumvent the principles behind these policies would not be 
viewed favorably.  
However, nations deciding to override treaties to the detriment of OECD 
goals are certainly not unheard of, and the United States would be able to 
make a plausible argument that the temporary use of retaliatory measures is 
justified by what it perceives as an unjust targeting of its corporations.  In 
light of these factors, the United States would likely be able to mitigate any 
adverse reaction from the OECD by ensuring that a retaliatory tax is 
implemented for a brief time as a signaling measure. 
The final obstacle to the use of § 891 as a response to European 
Commission tax measures is WTO obligations.  Should the WTO decide to 
intervene and issue a ruling against the United States, there would be a 
considerably more direct adverse impact than would result from any 
potential action that could be taken by the OECD.  However, the WTO 
would only intervene if the use of § 891 constituted an impermissible barrier 
on trade. 
Obviously, the doubling of the income tax rate for citizens of a certain 
country would not constitute a traditional trade barrier because it is not 
limited by product type.  Further, the tax shift would not be limited by the 
source of a foreign residents income, so the WTO would likely have 
difficulty in determining that § 891 would constitute an indirect trade barrier.  
The only avenue by which the WTO could make such a determination would 
be in finding that doubling income tax on foreign citizens is impermissible 
because it indirectly affects trade by considerably discouraging foreign 
investment.  Because the movement of both goods and services falls under 
the purview of the WTO, the DSB could determine that attempts to prevent 
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foreign citizens from providing services under the same conditions as 
domestic residents would be impermissible.  
However, such a determination is unlikely.  First, the WTO generally 
shows at least some degree of deference to cases in which it feels that 
retaliation is justified.  For reasons noted earlier, the United States could 
certainly argue that the steps taken by the European Commission provide 
such justification.  Second, such a finding would be at the limits of what sort 
of taxation could possibly be viewed as constituting impermissible trade 
barriers.  Because the WTO relies upon Member States to accept their 
decisions in order to provide them legitimacy, the DSB will likely be wary of 
limiting the ability of Member States to set their own tax policy in these 
types of cases.  Lastly, while the WTO is not hesitant to issue rulings on tax 
disputes when appropriate, it certainly recognizes that its primary role is to 
regulate trade, not tax.  Therefore, there is a considerable incentive for the 
WTO to decline to intervene and allow any resulting dispute to be worked 
out either bilaterally or in an alternative forum.  Unless the application of 
§ 891 significantly escalated tensions and thereby contributed to a series of 
retaliatory measures affecting not just tax, but trade as well, the WTO would 
likely not exercise jurisdiction over a resulting case. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Corporations dedicate considerable effort to minimizing their tax bill, and 
likewise nations use their tax policy to attract jobs and capital investment to 
their shores.  Traditionally, states have been relatively free to set their own 
tax rates without interference by other entities.  However, the desire to attract 
especially large American multinational corporations has fostered resentment 
among various members of the European Community.  A number of these 
states feel that these corporations have been granted fundamentally unfair tax 
rates by other members of the community.  With an extremely generous 
effective tax rate extended to Apple in Ireland as a prime example, the 
supranational bodies of the European Union have begun to take action. 
Recently, the European Commission ordered the Irish government to 
collect a significant amount of taxes from Apple.  This step offended not 
only Irish notions of sovereignty, but also cut against the ability of nations to 
negotiate an equitable division of tax revenue from each other’s citizens.  
Accordingly, both the Irish government and the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury have expressed considerable consternation at these actions since 
they threaten to detrimentally impact key sources of tax revenue and foreign 
investment. 
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This raises the question of what avenues are available for the United 
States to take steps to retaliate against what it views as unfair interference by 
a supranational body.  Despite recent movement towards a greater degree of 
cohesion, international tax law is still a large body of laws.  Where the WTO 
traditionally governs international trade, international tax is instead built 
upon numerous bilateral treaties between individual states, the use of the 
OECD as a forum for discussion of policy and best practices, and occasional 
intervention by the WTO when a tax policy is concluded to adversely affect 
trade. 
Section 891 of the IRC allows the U.S. President to double the income tax 
of citizens of foreign states when those states are engaging in discriminatory 
taxation.  The statute presents the most direct avenue for retaliation against 
action by the European Commission, but it would be subject to several layers 
of legal challenges if invoked. 
From a domestic standpoint, the law would be subject to significant 
challenges unless Congress decided to enact a statute indicating that § 891 
preempts any relevant bilateral treaty prohibiting nondiscrimination.  
However, if a statute were to be authorized, it would be likely that the United 
States could evade international legal challenges at least long enough to send 
a strong message to the European Commission.  Because most tax treaties do 
not mandate arbitration in case of a dispute, and the WTO is the only 
supranational entity that issues direct penalties for unjust taxation, but 
exercises limited reach in that area, the use of § 891 represents a feasible step 
to respond to the European Commission from a legal perspective.  
